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Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues

of Shields over Swords
Daniel Kalderimis*

INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the impact of the WTO on non-trade
values: a question at the heart of the debate on trade in genetically modified food products. In examining the impact, this Article takes a fresh perspective. Identifying the main tension as
WTO harmonization agreements, it argues that harmonization
agreements can be divided into two types: progressive harmonization agreements, which seek to attain some non-trade valuethus expanding the reach of the WTO system; and defensive
harmonization agreements, which seek to further restrain nontrade values from interfering with free trade.
Both types of harmonization agreements therefore intersect
with non-trade values. Progressive harmonization agreements
use non-trade values as swords-in the sense that breach of a
relevant non-trade value becomes a breach of the WTO. Defensive harmonization agreements, on the other hand, work to prevent non-trade values from being invoked as shields against
WTO discipline. This Article presents concerns with both species of harmonization, but finds defensive harmonization to be
particularly problematic. It is argued that defensive harmonization in the WTO arbitrarily increases the reach of free trade
into non-trade values and thereby disturbs the "contractual balance" enshrined in the scheme of the GATT. The Article concludes with two proposals.
First, defensive harmonization
agreements should only come into play following a proven

* Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Petros Mavroidis,
Joanne Scott, Grainne de Burca and George Bermann for their comments on drafts
of this article and for thought-provoking discussions of the issues addressed. Richard Stewart kindly provided me with a copy of his draft paper on GMO regulation.
All errors remain, of course, my own.
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breach of the GATT; second, defensive harmonization agreements should be tied explicitly to the relevant limbs of GATT
Article XX. Adopting these proposals will protect the GATT
contractual balance and allow non-trade values to operate,
where appropriate, as shields to free trade.
I.

QUESTION: DOES THE WTO HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS? ANSWER: DOES IT MATTER?

A. WTO CONSTITUTIONALIZATION AND LINKAGES: THE BROAD
DEBATES

The end of World War II prompted a period of unprecedented international cooperation. 1 The direct experience of devastating war led nation states to explore new solutions to pre2
vent the conditions of 1930s Europe from happening again.
Some solutions, such as the Marshall Plan, involved unilateral
intervention. 3 Others, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),4 created an environment of multilateral
cooperation. Still others, such as the United Nations Charter,
led to the creation of new international institutions.
Fifty years later, the institutional model has generally
proved the most durable. 5 International institutions relating to

1.
THOMAS

See CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1992); see also
RISSE-KAPPEN,

COOPERATION

AMONG

DEMOCRACIES,

THE

EUROPEAN

INFLUENCE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1995).
2. See STEPHEN AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM (7th ed. 1993); ERROL MENDES
& OZAY MEHMET, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, ECONOMY AND LAW: WAITING FOR JUSTICE
2 (2003).
3. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE: 1947-1952 (1987).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
5. There are, however, recent signals that in the post-Cold War world the
United States is beginning again to favor unilateral intervention. The refusal of the
United States to sign the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on
Global Climate Change and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
and its circumvention of the United Nations in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq, may indicate a relative weakening of the power of international institutions. See generally David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on
Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al; Thomas M. Frank, The United
States and the International Criminal Court: Unilateralism Run Rampant, 35
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 519 (2003); Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International
Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (2003); Jos6 E. Alvarez,
InternationalHegemonic Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (2003).
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areas as diverse as global health,6 security and disarmament, 7
environment, 8 agriculture, 9 educationl0 and even postal services1 1 have become an accepted (even inevitable) part of global
governance. 12 As they age, they have evolved. Institutions with
modest aims, such as the 1951 European Community for Coal
and Steel, have developed into institutions with constitutional
aspirations. 13 Indeed, the European Union (EU) is.presently in
the process of debating and drafting a Constitutional Treaty to
usher in an even closer era of cooperation. 14
This Article is concerned with the "constitution" of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the international institution
which grew out of the 1947 GATT.15 As Joseph Weiler has
6. See, e.g., The World Health Organization, at http://www.who.int/en (last
visited Jan. 28, 2004).
7. See,
e.g.,
The
International
Atomic
Energy
Agency,
at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
8. See, e.g.,
The
United
Nations
Environment
Programme,
at
http://www.unep.ch (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); see also The International Oceanographic Commission, at http://ioc.unesco.org/iocweb (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
9. See, e.g., The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, at
http://www.fao.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
10. See, e.g., The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, at http://www.unesco.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); The International Bureau of Education, at http://www.ibe.unesco.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
11. See The Universal Postal Union, at http://www.upu.int (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).

12.

And, further, a nascent region of international law.

See, e.g., JAN

KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (2002). See
also The 2003 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, at http://www.uia.org/

organizationshome.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (indexing some 44,000 international organizations of which 5,900 are inter-governmental).
13. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M.
247 (Member States of the European Communities [European Community for Coal
and Steel, European Economic Community, European Atomic Community] established the European Union with the aim of creating an ever closer union between
the peoples of Europe.). Id. art. A.
14. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003,
available at http://european-convention.eu.int/DraftTreaty.asp?lang-EN (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). See also Report from the Presidency of the Convention to the
President of the European Council, July 18, 2003, CONV 851/03, available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00851.enO3.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).
15. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY

ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. All of the documents
comprising the WTO system are attached to the Final Act, including the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO which serves as an umbrella agreement for specific WTO agreements. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33

I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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pointed out, "constitution" is a rich term and can include both
the makeup or composition of an entity (as in, how is the WTO
comprised?), as well as the system of fundamental principles
which govern the entity (as in, does the WTO have constitu16
tional status?).
Many esteemed minds have already turned their attention
to the second of these constitutional questions. Despite the
WTO's relative youth, serious comparison is already being made
to the political institutions of the EU.17 In some ways this comparison is valid and useful. The core principles of the EUfreedom of movement of goods, people, services and capital 8 -are
similar to the core principles of the WTO (although the WTO
does not, yet, apply to people or capital movement). Both organizations are powerful, expanding and engaged in balancing
trade and non-trade values.
In other respects, the comparison is less apt. Hidden in the
WTO constitutionalism debate is a tension between the "ought"
and the "is". Some commentators seem to be arguing descriptively that the WTO shows incipient signs of EU-style constitutionalization; 19 others seem to be arguing normatively that,
whatever the present position, the WTO should embrace a more
constitutional vision. 20 When the two arguments are separated,

16. J. H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE viii (1999); see John H.
Jackson, The WTO 'Constitution'and Proposed Reforms: Seven "Mantras'Revisited, 4
J. INT'L ECON. L. 67 (2001) (providing a lucid discussion of the first sense of constitution).
17. Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and ConstitutionalPerspectives
of WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 167 (2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO
Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 19 (2000); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to ConstitutionalizeInternationalLaw and Foreign Policy for the Benefit
of Civil Society?, 20 MICH J. INT'L L. 1 (1998); Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO:
Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (Grainne De Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001).
18.

See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J.

(C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The treaty provides the right to free
movement of goods, id. art. 23, the right to free movement of people, id. arts. 39, 43,
the right to trade in services without restrictions, id. art. 49, and the right to transfer capital without restrictions, id. art. 56.
19. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 17; Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and
Human Rights, supra note 17; Meinhard Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles- Which
Orientationfor WTO/GATT Law?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111 (2001).
20. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier, Limits to InternationalTrade: The Constitutional
Challenge, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 220 (2000); Krajewski, supra note 17; Marco
C. E. J. Bronkers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 41 (2001); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, 4 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 3 (2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and the Millennium Round, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN
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the better view is that the WTO is not yet a constitutional system because it has no clear polity, direct effect, individual access, defined scope or intrinsic/higher-order authority. 21 The
real locus of the constitutional debate is whether the WTO
should become such a system. Those who think it should urge
the WTO to actively involve itself in other issue areas such as
the environment, labor and human rights. 22 Given its wider
scope and explicit focus on constitutionalism, the EU is an obvious template for such a process. 23 A possible endgame is the
evolution of the WTO into a type of "World Government." 24 A
less radical way to approach the same issue is to consider how
the WTO might involve itself in other issue areas, without necessarily seeking to control or exclusively regulate them. The
leading article in this field is David Leebron's Linkages,25 which
sets out a taxonomy of how different international regimes can
be linked, and criteria for evaluating the question of whether
they should be linked.
B. KEEPING ONE FOOT ON THE GROUND: AN OUTLINE OF A
DIFFERENT ARGUMENT
This Article places itself in the context of these broad debates over whether the WTO should seek to become a more constitutional system and whether it should link explicitly to other
regimes. However, this Article argues that both debates start in
the wrong place. That is, they target the second meaning of
"constitution" at the expense of the first.26 The debates over
whether the WTO should become a constitutional system, or
HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 111 (Marco Bronkers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).

21. See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizingthe WTO Is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM (R. B.

Porter et al. eds., 2001); Krajewski, supra note 17.
22. Petersmann, supra note 17; see, e.g., supranote 20 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Characterof Supranationalism:The Example of the European Community, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999).
24. See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity, in DELIBERATELY DEMOCRATIZING
MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS (Marco Verweij & Tim Josling eds., 2003); Howse &
Nicolaidis, supra note 21. Both articles point out the dangers of this endgame (and
how it is linked to constitutional discourse in the second sense).
25. David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 17-24 (2002); see also
Jos6 E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade
Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (2001).
26. For the two meanings see supra, notes 16, 24 and accompanying text.
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over how it might link to other regimes, ignore the more pressing fact that the WTO already does control non-trade values and
is linked to other regimes. The control exists because the WTO's
wide membership, sophisticated dispute resolution system, and
effective sanctions ensure that in practice (and notwithstanding
other international agreements) WTO values trump non-WTO
values. The linkages follow because many issues of international concern-such as health and environmental protectionintersect with the goal of free trade. In sum, the WTO makes
powerful rules governing non-WTO policies by omission. This
case is made in Part II.
Part III sets out the nature of the WTO linkages in some
detail. To begin with, it argues that the "contractual balance" of
the GATT created several valves for non-trade values to co-exist
with GATT discipline. Today, the main challenges to the GATT
contractual balance are WTO harmonization agreements. Part
III examines the WTO harmonization agreements and then
categorizes them into two groups: progressive and defensive.
Progressive harmonization agreements seek to attain some nontrade value-thus expanding the values of the WTO system; defensive harmonization agreements seek only to further restrain
non-trade values from interfering with free-trade.
Part IV argues that the WTO harmonization agreements,
both progressive and defensive, threaten to upset the contractual balance as they add new and independent obligations.
They are, however, problematic for different reasons. The problem with progressive agreements is simply that they are premature. Although the WTO has the raw power to conclude progressive measures, it does not yet have the polity or authority to
do so legitimately. This Article recommends a standstill on such
agreements. Perhaps greater legitimacy will come in time, but
it should not be preempted. In particular, progressive agreements and linkages that would back non-WTO values with WTO
discipline are premature, as is talk of constitutionalization. All
such movement should wait until there is broader agreement on
the legitimacy of the WTO to make policy in non-trade areas.
As to defensive agreements, Part IV argues that these are
conceptually empty and represent a blindside threat to nontrade values. This is because they seek to regulate a non-trade
value with the sole object of preventing that value from interfering with free trade. Given the WTO's unchallenged power, this
leads to dangerously myopic rules. Defensive agreements are
especially objectionable when not properly tied into the GATT
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agreement and its derogation provisions. Accordingly, this Article recommends first that existing defensive agreements should
be expressly subject to the GATT derogation provisions and secondly that the GATT should be amended to recognize additional
grounds of derogation (for instance labor rights) and to include
carve-outs for important international agreements concerning
non-trade values.
The overall argument can be summarized in an aphorism:
non-trade values should be used as shields to WTO claims,
rather than swords backed by WTO power.
II. WHY THE PERTINENT QUESTION IS 'WHAT ARE WTO
LINKAGES TODAY?
Keohane and Nye's well-known analysis of post-World War
II international institutions depicts them as clubs of negotiators
bargaining with one another within specified issue areas. 27 Referred to as "decomposable hierarchies", 28 the international regimes which emerged had narrow constituencies, usually composed of specialized technocrats, and little contact with other
regimes. Keohane and Nye argue that the international club
model has been undercut by its own success-leading to greater
interdependence between different issue areas and a need for
greater cooperation between different regimes. 29 This is the
tricky question of linkages referred to above and is the source of
much tension over globalization.
But any discussion of the WTO as an example of the club
model of international relations needs to appreciate its preeminent position. Excepting the EU, which does not conform to the
international club model, 30 the WTO has achieved a level of institutionalization and power which sets it apart from the other
international clubs.

31

There are three main reasons for this.

First, the core areas of the WTO, trade in goods and services,
27. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic
Legitimacy, (2000) (unpublished paper prepared for the American Political Science
Convention, Washington D.C.) (on file with author).
28.

HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 197-207 (3d ed. 1996)

(developing this terminology).
29. Keohane & Nye, supranote 27.
30. The EU is better viewed as an expansive regional integration agreement
rather than an international club with a specified issue area. See generally supra
notes 13-14, 18, 27.
31. See generally Alvarez, supra note 25.
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have many natural intersections with other areas. This is the
lesson that the finance minister of any government knows well,
and is demonstrated by the importance of the Interstate Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution. 32 Second, WTO Member
states usually take their WTO obligations seriously, as trade
sanctions can have immediate and politically explosive economic
impacts. This can contrast with attitudes towards environmental or labor violations, for instance, where the consequences
may be more latent. Third, and most importantly, the WTO has
a mandatory, legalistic and binding dispute settlement system,
a rarity for international institutions. 33 The Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) of the WTO has rightly been called an
important success. 34 Although the WTO does not have an enforcement system, the rigorous dispute settlement procedure
promotes early settlement. 35 The "shadow of the law" cast by
36
the WTO system is significant.
The net result is not only that WTO rules have a broad
reach, but that they effectively trump other regime rules. Why
is this? Because, while there are multiple legal regimes all pulling in different directions, there is only one world and the most
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33. The WTO is, however, not the only international institution with such a
dispute resolution procedure. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also
has compulsory jurisdiction to issue final and binding rulings. See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1322-24.
34. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter DSU]. See generally
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

(1997); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:An Overview
of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999); Press Release 180,
World Trade Organization, WTO's Unique System of Settling Disputes Nears 200
Cases in 2000 (June 5, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
pres00_e/pr180 e.htm.
35. Eric Reinhardt reports that the probability of settlement increases on average twenty-seven percent after a panel is established (but drops eighteen percent if
the panel rules for the complainant). Eric Reinhardt, Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 174, 178 (2001). The net effect
of seeking a panel is to significantly increase the level of liberalization of disputed
measures by approximately ten percent. Id.
36. See Mark L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law:
Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 457, 460
(Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002); Mark L. Busch & Eric
Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATTIWTO
Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158 (2000).
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powerful regime calls the shots. One might consider the issue
this way-divide all the possible domestic measures of country
X into (a) those which potentially affect trade in goods or services; and (b) those which do not. Looking only at group (a),
imagine the possible underlying purposes for these measures.
Unless the underlying purpose is to facilitate international
trade, any group (a) measure will potentially conflict with WTO
discipline. This reflects the simple point that there is a potential conflict between the WTO values of free and nondiscriminatory trade on the one hand, and all other conceivable
values-be they labor, human rights, national security, environmental, social justice, or public health.3 7 These possible intersections are depicted in Figure 1 below.
National security (e.g., restrictions on import of sensitive products from potential
adversaries)

Human rights (e.g., trade
sanctions on products
made using child labor)
Consumer protection (e.g.,
ensuring products are labeled
with appropriate risk warnings)

Health (e.g., controlling risks
of new products/technologies)

Free and nondiscriminatory
trade in goods
and services

Environment (e.g., protecting native plants, animals

and biodiversity)

Figure 1: Intersections of trade and non-trade values
If country Y is sufficiently concerned that a proposed measure of country X will detrimentally affect its trading interests,
this potential conflict between values becomes actual. The question then becomes, how is this conflict resolved? Because of the
unusual sophistication of the WTO DSU, it is likely that country
Y will invoke this body rather than any other forum. 38 In the
DSU, the question asked is not which values should prevail but
whether the non-WTO measure is consistent with the WTO

rule. 39 If not, the WTO rule will prevail. This creates a practi-

37. This point, and some possible solutions, was carefully explained before the
WTO was created. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992).
38. DSU, supra note 34, art. 23.1.
39. DSU, supra note 34, art. 3.4 (specifying that all rulings and recommenda-
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cal hierarchy with WTO rules at the top. Although Member
states have international labor, environmental and human
rights obligations, these must always submit to WTO discipline.
In contrast, WTO rules are not judged according to these other
standards.
This analysis reveals two things. The first is that the WTO
is a precocious organization-one that has accumulated significant influence in a short space of time, and fast outstripped the
development of other international clubs. It is also a focused institution concerned with free trade issues. The WTO, then,
combines effective power with a narrow agenda. A crude analogy is a single issue domestic government. In one sense it may
be true that such a government has only one set of policies, but
in fact the government has policies on a wide range of mattersit is just that most are made by omission. The combination of
the WTO's single-mindedness and power indicates that the initial question is not what linkages should the WTO make in the
future to take account of non-WTO values, but what is the state
of those linkages right now?.
III. THE NATURE OF WTO LINKAGES TODAY, AND THE
THORNY ISSUE OF WTO HARMONIZATION
The WTO's effective but focused power challenges the notion of "embedded liberalism" which has given legitimacy and
support to much of the economic liberalization of the last halfcentury. 40 Embedded liberalism is the concept that there was
an implicit bargain behind the expansion of international economic liberalization after World War II: that the new international agreements 41 would not undo domestic social protections
created variously in the New Deal/Keynesian/Social Democratic
eras of the 1930s. 42 On this view, the GATT represents a bar-

tions made by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body must be "in accordance with the
rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements"
and Article 3(5) which requires that all solutions to matters formally raised in the
VVTO system "shall be consistent with [the covered] agreements").
40. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (1982).
41. See GATT, supra note 4; The Articles of the International Monetary Fund,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, art. VIII, § 2(a) (July 22, 1944), as amended, 20
UST 2775, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 11898 (prohibiting the imposition of "restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions").
42. Ruggie, supra note 40, at 392-93.
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gain, a compromise, in which all sectors of society agreed to
open markets, but also to contain and share the social adjustment costs that open markets inevitably produce. 43 It is partly
a sense that the WTO is unsetting this bargain which led to the
massive but unfocused globalization protests over the 1999
failThird Ministerial Conference in Seattle, and to the recent
44
ure of the 2003 Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun.
Anti-globalization activists are correct in assuming that
much of the actual balancing between different values is done in
the WTO according to WTO rules. This does not necessarily
mean that the actual balance struck is off-kilter. It does, however, necessitate an inquiry into what the WTO rules provide
and how they are applied.
A. OBLIGATIONS AND DEROGATIONS: THE WTO'S CONTRACTUAL
BALANCE
Academics often speak of the "institutional balance" of the
WTO, meaning the divisions of power between the different
WTO entities: the Secretariat, the Member States, the Appellate
Body (AB) and Panels.4 5 There is general agreement that this
balance is a factor lending stability and legitimacy to the
WTO. 46 The same is true, however-and perhaps even more
so-for the very elements of the GATT contract, which is also
the model for the General Agreement on Trade in Services

43. John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate
Connection, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 93 (David Held
& Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003).
44. As to Seattle see JANET THOMAS, THE BATTLE IN SEATTLE: THE STORY
BEHIND AND BEYOND THE WTO DEMONSTRATIONS (2000). As to Cancun see Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 15, 2003, at Al. The failure in Cancun was largely a result of the disinclination of developing countries to agree to expand the WTO to address the so-called
"Singapore Issues": competition, investment, transparency in trade facilitation and
government procurement. See Luke Eric Petersen, Singapore Issues Break Cancun's
Back, INV. LAW AND POL. WKLY. NEWS BULL., Sept. 14, 2003, available at
http://www.investmentwatch.org/articles/investsdl5sep.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).
See generally STARHAWK, WEBS OF POWER: NOTES FROM THE GLOBAL
UPRISING (2002); JERRY MANDER & EDWARD GOLDSMITH, THE CASE AGAINST THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001).

45.

See, e.g., Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial

and the Political Organs of the WTO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 325 (Marco Bronkers &

Reinhard Quick eds., 2000); Eric Stein, InternationalIntegrationand Democracy: No
Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489 (2001).

46.

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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(GATS).47 The essence of this contract is that Members have
core trade obligations which can be derogated from where such
derogation is necessary to protect non-trade values. 48 This concept, which is central to the argument below, will be referred to
as the "contractual balance" of the WTO.
This contractual balance reflects Ruggie's bargain of embedded liberalism. 49 Some might object that the GATT (and the
GATS) is now merely a part of the WTO structure and that the
bargain it represents has therefore diminished in importance.
But this view allows the form of the WTO to obscure its substance. In reality, the GATT remains the cornerstone of the
WTO. Most of the other WTO Agreements, such as the Subsidies Agreement, 50 the Anti-Dumping Agreement 51 and the Safeguards Agreement, 52 merely elaborate GATT obligations. Moreover, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that GATT
obligations represent possibly the only core of deep agreement
amongst WTO Members. 53 Whatever additions are made to the
WTO Agreement, members should be careful to preserve the
bargain that made the GATT successful for fifty years.
To be clear, the contractual balance has two elements. The
47. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter GATS]. Although there are some important structural differences between the GATT and the GATS (the GATS' positive and negative
list approach to obligations being the most striking), the two are properly viewed as
different sides of the same coin. They each strive for the same goals of trade liberalization but in the different fields of goods and services. Because of this deep similarity, this article does not generally attempt to distinguish between the two. Indeed this article will refer solely or primarily to the GATT when making points also
applicable to the GATS.
48. See GATT, supra note 4, arts. I-III, XI, XX; GATS, supra note 47, arts. II,
XIV, XVI, XVII.
49. See Ruggie, supra notes 40, 43.
50. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available
at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies].
51. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter
Anti-bargaining Agreement].
52. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards].
53. This precept was underscored by the September 2003 WTO Ministerial in
Cancun, at which WTO member countries failed to progress potential extensions to
the WTO mooted in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. See World Trade Organization Ministerial Declarationat Doha, WT/MIN(01)DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.wto.org. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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first is the need to establish breach-most likely of GATT Articles I, III or XI.54 Each of these articles is worded so as to permit some interplay with other values. The most striking example of this balancing process is Asbestos 55 in which an EC
marketing and import ban on asbestos-containing construction
materials was held not to breach the national treatment obligation of Article III.4. The reason was that construction materials
containing asbestos are not "like products" to construction materials not containing asbestos. 56 This case therefore explicitly
balanced trade and non-trade values in the breach phase.
The second element is the ability to derogate. The GATT
derogation provisions include Article XIX, relating to safeguards; Article XXIV, relating to free-trade agreements; and Article XXI, relating to national security exceptions.5 7 But the
primary provision is of course Article XX, which specifies the
general exceptions to GATT discipline. 58 The GATS equivalent
is Article XIV. 59 Below, this Article refers to GATT Article XX

and GATS Article XIV as the "general derogation provisions."
The general derogation provisions function like defenses in
a criminal trial and excuse a breach of WTO discipline where
the otherwise offending measure is justified by reference to a
listed non-WTO value. The values covered by the general derogation provisions are wide and include health, public morality,
plant and animal life and natural resources. 60 There are, however, some glaring omissions; namely labor and other human
rights. WTO-inconsistent measures undertaken for such purposes are not explicitly excused.
As the club model has broken down, case law under GATT
Article XX has developed with the growing awareness of the importance of the GATT contractual balance. Pre-WTO GATT
cases, such as Thai Cigarettes 61 and the two Tuna/Dolphin
54. GATT, supra note 4, arts. I, III, XI.
55. WTO Appellate Body Report, EC - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT[DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1193 (2001),
available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Asbestos].
56. Id. paras. 87-88.
57. GATT, supra note 4, arts. XIX, XXIV, XXI.
58. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX.
59. See GATS, supra note 47, art. XIV, 33 I.L.M. at 57. The GATS also contains an equivalent to the national security exceptions contained in GATT Article
XXI. See id. art. XIV, 33 I.L.M. at 59.
60. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XX; GATS, supra note 47, art. XIV.
61. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thailand - Restriction on Importation and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at
200 (Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes].
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cases 62 had sought to restrictively interpret the scope of Article
XX. In Thai Cigarettes,the Panel held that a measure granting
the Thai Tobacco Monopoly the sole right to import foreign cigarettes 63 was inconsistent with GATT Article XI and was not
saved by GATT Article XX(b).6 4 With regard to GATT Article
XX(b), Thailand had argued that its import policy was justified
by its anti-smoking health policies. 65 Allowing open competition
on the cigarette market, it was submitted, would likely lead to
increased rates of smoking in the Thai population. 66 Thailand
also argued that U.S. cigarettes were more harmful than Thai
cigarettes. 67 The Panel held that alternative, GATT-consistent
measures, including a total ban of cigarette advertising, governmental anti-smoking campaigns, and strict labeling requirements, could address Thailand's concerns about both quantity and quality of cigarettes. 68 Critics asserted that these
alternatives were more in the nature of inexpert hypotheses
69
than realistic health regulation.
In the first Tuna/Dolphin case (which was not adopted),
the Panel held that a Member had no right under GATT Article
XX to unilaterally adopt environmental policies with "extraterritorial" application. 70 To permit such policies would jeopardize
the GATT as a multilateral framework. The Panel in the second
Tuna/Dolphin case (which was also not adopted) echoed similar
reasoning and emphasized that GATT Article XX was intended
as a narrow derogation from GATT discipline. 71 As a result of
this ruling, and the introduction in Tuna/Dolphin I of the now-

62. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. - Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, DS21/R, submitted to parties Aug. 16, 1991, not adopted, 30 I.L.M. 1594
(1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin 1]; GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, circulated June 16, 1994, not adopted, 33 I.L.M.
839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I1].
63. Incidentally, the Thai Monopoly only exercised this right on three occasions
between 1966 and 1990.
64. Thai Cigarettes,supra note 61, para. 87, at 228.
65. Id. para. 27, at 208.
66. Id. para. 23.
67. Id. para. 28.
68. Id. paras. 76-81, at 226-81.
69. See, e.g., Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International
Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be
Drawn from the Jurisprudenceof the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE

OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD

TRADE LAW 139, 140 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000).
70. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 62, 30 I.L.M., para. 5.32.
71. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 62, 33 I.L.M., para. 5.38.
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the
saw
many
doctrine, 72
"product/process"
infamous
to
purMembers' ability
Tuna/Dolphin decisions as restricting
73
sue broad environmental agendas.
Following the activation of the WTO Agreement, WTO panels and particularly the AB have been more careful to respect
Member autonomy under GATT Article XX. The watershed case
was Shrimp/Turtles in which the AB held that a U.S. import
ban on shrimp caught without "turtle excluder devices" was
provisionally justified under GATT Article XX(g), relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 74 Thus, turtles
qualify as an exhaustible natural resource, and unilateral
measures are not prima facie illegitimate. Although the AB
held that the U.S. measure was inconsistent with the chapeau
to GATT Article XX, it did so through a relatively subtle argument that, without transparent and consistent treatment of offending countries, the U.S. measure constituted "unjustifiable
75
discrimination."
Since Shrimp/Turtles, the AB has confirmed a relatively
broad approach to the scope of GATT Article XX-for instance,
76
clean air also qualifies as an exhaustible natural resource.
Present jurisprudence confirms that Members can choose their
own level of environmental or health protection, but must ensure that the regulatory mechanism for securing this level is the
least trade-restrictive means reasonably available. 77 This test is
72. The Panel held that members could only properly discriminate against
products on the basis of their nature and content, but not due to their production
method. Id. para. 5.11-5.12. This is relevant not to establishing a defense under
GATT Article XX, but in establishing breach under GATT Articles I, III or XI.
73. See Don Mayer & David Hoch, InternationalEnvironmental Protectionand
the GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 187 (1993); R. Kenton
Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT - Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33
NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1993).
74. WTO Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, circulated Oct. 12, 1998, available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtles].
75. Id. para. 176.
76. WTO Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996),
available at http://www.wto.org. The initial Dispute Panel concluded that the U.S.
preference for domestic gasoline could not be justified by Article XX(g)'s provisions
relating to protection of exhaustible natural resources.
77. The AB has also determined a relatively certain legal inquiry. The first
question is whether the relevant GATT Article XX exception is satisfied-whether
the measure at issue is "necessary" or "related to" the relevant objective. "Necessary" need not mean inevitable. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Beef, WT/DS163,169/AB/R, circulated Dec. 11,
2000, adopted Jan. 10, 2001, 26 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. 1, available at
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not neutral because it places trade values at a premium over
non-trade values, but it is generally sensitive to the link between WTO discipline and other values. While not perfect, the
general derogation system provides a workable valve for other
values to compete against WTO values.
B.

WTO

HARMONIZATION AGREEMENTS IN DETAIL

To complicate matters, the WTO contains four mandatory
"positive integration," or "harmonization" agreements in
addition to the core agreements on trade in goods and services. The
GATT and the GATS are often referred to as "negative integration" agreements in that they prohibit certain types of conduct
but do not prescribe positive policies for Member states. 78 The
four mandatory WTO harmonization agreements are:
79
(1) the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS);

(2) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT);

80

(3) the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS); 8 ' and
82
(4) the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).

This Article takes issue with these agreements. The premise advanced is that WTO harmonization measures upset the
GATT contractual balance, and that this undermines the legitimacy of the WTO.

http://www.wto.org. "Related to" requires some direct connection. Shrimp/Turtles,
supra note 74. In determining these questions, regard is to be had to whether an
alternative GATT-consistent measure is reasonably available to achieve the Members' objectives. No proportionality test appears to be imposed. It is only after the
relevant exception is satisfied that the additional conditions of the GATT Article XX
chapeau are applied. See Shrimp/Turtles,supra note 74, paras. 147-76.
78. Petersmann, supra note 34, at 179.
79. Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available
at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
80. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
81. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 33 I.L.M. 81, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
82. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available
at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
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1. Health, Environmentaland Technical Regulations in the
WTO
a.

The SPS Agreement

The SPS Agreement applies to all "sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade."8 3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are

defined in Annex A as measures applied to protect human, animal or plant life or health from risks arising from the entry of
pests, diseases or contaminants.8 4 The SPS Agreement does not
require that Members adopt any SPS measures; it merely provides that all SPS measures applied by a Member must be consistent with the SPS Agreement.8 5 The SPS Agreement requires
that SPS measures:
(1) be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health, be based on scientific principles, and not be main86
tained without sufficient scientific evidence;
(2) not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members,
and
87
not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade;
(3) either be:
(i) based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations
where they exist; 88 or
(ii) based on a scientific risk assessment taking account of a wide
range of factors, including economic factors 89 -unless relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, in which case the Member may provisionally adopt SPS measures and seek to perform a scientific risk assessment within a reasonable period of time; 90 and
(4) not be more trade-restrictive than
required to achieve the Member's
91
appropriate level of SPS protection.

At face value these provisions appear reasonable to prevent
disingenuous invocation of health concerns from restricting in83. SPS Agreement, supra note 79, art. 1.1.
84. This definition is a simplified paraphrase of four relatively prolix limbs of
the SPS Annex A, Article 1 definitions. SPS Agreement, supra note 79, art. 1.
85. SPS Agreement, supra note 79, art. 2.1.
86. Id. art. 2.2.
87. Id. arts. 2.3, 5.5.
88. Id. art. 3.1.
89. Id. arts. 3.2, 5.1, 5.2.
90. Id. art. 5.7.
91. SPS Agreement, supra note 79, art. 5.6.
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ternational trade; however, issues of science are rarely so simple. As a current example in a related regime, the U.S. sugar
industry, in association with other U.S. food industry groups, is
lobbying the U.S. Congress to cut funding to the World Health
Organization (WHO) on the basis that a particular WHO report
is "scientifically flawed." 92 This WHO report recommends that

sugar should account for no more than ten percent of a healthy
diet. 93 The sugar industry insists that the correct figure is
twenty-five percent. 94 This is precisely the sort of challenge the
95
SPS invites.
There have now been three cases clarifying SPS obligations:

98
97
Australia- Salmon,96 EU - Hormones and Japan- Varietals.

In each of them, the defending government was found to have
breached the SPS, but there was no finding (and sometimes no
allegation) that the government breached the GATT. Each case
is briefly outlined below.
The measure at issue in Salmon was a regulation which required imported salmon to be heat-treated to kill possible disease agents. 99 Thus, "fresh, chilled or frozen" salmon was prohibited. 10 0 On appeal, the AB agreed with the Panel (though for
slightly different reasons) that the measure was inconsistent
with the SPS because it was not based on a proper "risk assessment."'10 1 The 1996 Report purporting to justify the measure
contained "general and vague statements of mere possibility of
adverse events occurring."' 102 This was insufficient to establish

92. Sarah Boseley, Sugar Industry Threatens to Scupper WHO, GUARDIAN, Apr.
21, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/O,3604,940287,
OO.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See generally supra notes 84-91 (for an overview of the SPS Agreement).
96. WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia - MeasuresAffecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998), 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. 359, available
at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Salmon].
97. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26,48/ABR (Jan. 16, 1998), 4 BERNAN'S
ANNOTATED REP. 275, availableat http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Hormones].
98. WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999), 9 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. 351, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Varietals].
99. Salmon, supra note 96, paras. 1-2, 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 359.
100. Salmon, supra note 96, paras. 1-2, 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 359.
101. Salmon, supra note 96, paras. 127-31, 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 39293.
102. Salmon, supra note 96, paras. 127-31, 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 392-
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the probability, as opposed to the possibility, of adverse events.
Moreover, the 1996 Report did not properly link the measure
taken to the risks identified.1 03 The AB went even further, and
held that Australia was in breach of SPS Article 5.5 in that, by
reversing the recommendations of an earlier 1995 Draft Report,
by selectively targeting salmon but not other seafood species,
and by applying the ban externally but not internally, the
measure constituted a "disguised restriction on international
10 5
trade." 104 This bold ruling has raised some eyebrows.
In Hormones, the EU sought to defend a series of directives
which prohibited the importation of beef treated with any of six
106
growth hormones, on the basis of a possible link to cancer.
10 7
Use of these hormones was also banned within the EU itself.
The AB held that the EU had not based its directives on a scientific risk assessment. 108 The EU had itself conducted no formal
assessment and the scientific evidence before the AB did not rationally support the import prohibition. 109 The AB held that a
merely "theoretical" risk was insufficient to justify protective
measures. 110 The EU did not seek to justify the measures using
Article 5.7, which incorporates a version of the precautionary
principle, but instead argued that the precautionary principle
was a rule of customary international law and thus directly applicable to the dispute.11 1 The AB expressed doubt that the
principle is sufficiently well established outside the specific field
of international environmental law and determined that, even if
it were, it could not override positive SPS obligations such as
those in Articles 5.1 and 5.2.112
103. Salmon, supra note 96, paras. 132-34, 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 39394.
104. Salmon, supra note 96, paras. 177-78, 8 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 402.
105. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation World Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 271 (2000); Robert Howse & Petros C.
Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for GMOs - The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317 (2000).
106. For a full factual background see WTO Panel Report, EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Complaint by the U.S., WT/DS26/RIUSA, circulated Aug. 18, 1997, paras. 2.1-2.3, available at http://www.wto.org; EC - Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48JRPCAN, circulated Aug. 18, 1997, paras. 2.1-2.33, availableat http://www.wto.org.
107.
108.

340.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Hormones, supranote 97, para. 3, 4 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at 275.
Hormones, supra note 97, paras. 208-09, 4 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. at

Hormones, supra note 97, paras. 193, 208-09.
Id. para. 193.
Id. paras. 122-25.
Id.
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In Varietals, Japan sought to defend a measure banning
import of certain plants (including peaches, nectarines, and apricots) on the basis that they could be infested with the codling
moth, a pest not found in Japan. 113 An exemption regime existed, which required the importer to fumigate the plants in accordance with a "varietal testing requirement" (VTR).114 The
AB agreed with the Panel that the VTR was maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, in breach of SPS Article 2.2. Japan submitted that its measure was nevertheless justified under
the Article 5.7 precautionary principle. The AB disagreed, holding that-given the long history of the exemption regimeJapan had not sought to obtain additional information necessary for a more objective assessment within a reasonable period
115
of time.
Future SPS cases are likely to get harder and further distance SPS jurisprudence from GATT jurisprudence. Disputes
involving pesticide-treated food products are likely to arise presently. Even more controversially, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) will likely be the next battlefield. On May 13,
2003, the United States lodged a complaint against the EC's
2002 GMO directive which stipulates a firm labeling, tracing
and assessment policy. 116 Japan, Australia and New Zealand

113. For a full background, see WTO Panel Reports, Japan- Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products, WT/DS76JR, circulated Mar. 19, 1999, paras. 2.1-2.28, available at http://www.wto.org.
114. Id. paras. 2.1-2.28.
115. Varietals, supranote 98, para. 97.
116. See U.S. Contests Europe's Ban on Some Food, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003,
at C1. The challenged directive is European Commission Directive 2001/18, which
the United States contends implements a de facto moratorium on GMOs. See also
The EU Moratorium on AgriculturalBiotech Products:Claims and Facts, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/new/biotech-claimsandfacts.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
Directive 2001/18 repealed an earlier law on the release of GMOs and is facially intended to improve transparency through labeling, create a more efficient authorization process and provide principles governing risk assessment. In addition, there is
presently a debate about the terms of European Parliament and Council Regulations
which would further refine the rules for GMO labeling, traceability and use. See
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms and
Traceability of Food and Feed Products from Genetically Modified Organisms and
available
at
Amending
Directive
2001/18/EC,
COM(01)182
final,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/foodfbiotechnology/gmfood/biotech09_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, COM(01)425 final,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/gmo/biotech08_en.pdf (last visited Jan.
28, 2004).
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are moving in a similar direction. 117
The GMO debate is interesting not only because it illustrates the tension between the SPS and the GATT, but also because it illustrates the tension between the SPS and other international agreements.
Some international bodies have
supported restrictive GMO measures. For instance, a 2001
United Nations Development Programme Study tentatively supported GMO use, but urged countries to require transparent labeling of GMO products. 118 More importantly, the Convention
on Biological Diversity 1 9 recently adopted the Biosafety Protocol, which is a multilateral treaty designed to protect biodiversity.

20

The Protocol aims to establish rules for the transbound-

ary movements of GMOs (which it terms "Living Modified
Organisms," or LMOs). 12 1 Like the SPS, the Protocol purports
to balance the competing values of free trade, modern technology, sound science, and environmental and health protection. It
does so, however, from a different perspective since it aims primarily to protect biodiversity, and secondarily to protect human
health. 22 Its core obligations are safety-oriented and require
minimum safety standards in the handling, packaging and
transport of LMOs;23 comprehensive prior notification of transborder movements, 124 information sharing and informed consent; 125 mandatory labeling for LMOs intended for use as food or
117. On April 1, 2001, Japan introduced a rigorous labeling and detection policy
for GMOs. See Takeshi Matsuoka, GMO Labeling and Detection Methods in Japan
(unpublished paper), available at http://apec.biotec.or.th/pdf/MrTakeshiMatsuoka.
pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). Moves are being made in both Australia and New
Zealand to do the same. See Kym Anderson & Chantal Pohl Neilsen, How Will The
GMO Debate Affect the WTO and Farm Trade Reform? (unpublished paper), available at http://econ.massey.ac.nz/CAPS/s3publ7.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
118. United Nations Human Development Report, Making New Technologies
Work for Human Development, U.N. Development Programme, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001/en/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
119. United Nations Convention on Environment and Development, Convention
on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.biodiv.
org/conventionlarticles.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Convention].
120. The Biodiversity Protocol's full name is the Final Draft of Biosafety Protocol Approved at Montreal Meeting on Biological Diversity Convention (or Cartagena
Protocol). Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, vol. 23, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (200), available at http://www.biodiv.
org/biosafety/protocol.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Protocol]. Significantly, the United States is not a party.
121. Protocol, supra note 120, pmbl., arts. 1, 3.
122. Id. art. 1.
123. Id. art. 18.1.
124. Id. arts. 7, 8, 13.
125. Id. art. 19. The Protocol envisages the institution of a Biosafety Clearing-
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feed; 126 and minimum standards for risk assessment and man127
agement.
Like many international agreements, however, the Protocol's compliance mechanisms are very weak. The dispute settlement procedures of the Convention apply, which require only
negotiation, then non-binding mediation. 128 Alternatively, parties are encouraged to seek the compulsory jurisdiction of the
129
International Court of Justice.
This familiar situation highlights that the SPS Agreement
is able to use the WTO's preeminence to effectively trump the
Protocol. Notwithstanding potential justification under the Protocol, restrictive GMO measures (whether labeling and rigorous
assessment, or full moratorium) are vulnerable in the WTO. If
the SPS applies, 130 it could be argued that science does not support any non-theoretical risks of GMOs; that trade or labeling
measures applied are not rationally related to the relevant risk
assessment; or that measures taken are not the least restrictive
means of addressing the risks identified. 131 The interpretation
of Article 5.7 in Japan- Varietals is also concerning. 32 It seems
unlikely that Article 5.7 could support a lengthy moratorium on
new food technology on the simple basis that the risks are yet
unknown. Whatever the outcome, WTO compatibility-rather
than consistency with the Biosafety Protocol-will likely define
133
the GMO health policies of a number of countries.
b.

The TBT Agreement

The TBT Agreement applies to "technical regulations"
adopted by a Member. 134 These are widely defined in Annex 1 to
include any "[d]ocument which lays down product characterisHouse to facilitate the exchange of "scientific, technical, environmental and legal
information on, and experience with, living modified organisms." Id. art. 19.1.
126. Protocol, supra note 120, art. 18.2.
127. Id. arts. 15, 16.
128. See id. art. 34; Convention, supranote 119, arts. 27.1, 27.2.
129. See Convention, supra note 119, art. 27.3.
130. It is not quite clear that GMO regulation is an SPS matter due to the absence of bioengineering issues from the explicit definition of SPS measures in Annex
1. See supra notes 79, 83 et seq.
131. See supra notes 79, 83 (discussing SPS requirements).
132. See supra notes 98, 113 (discussing Varietals).
133. See generally supra Part II; supra notes 31-37. The WTO is the preeminent
international legal system with a robust dispute resolution and enforcement system.
Cf. supra notes 120, 128 (discussing the weak dispute resolution and enforcement
system of the Protocol).
134. See TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
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tics or their related processes and production methods ...

with

mandatory." 135

which compliance is
Technical regulations also
include labeling, packaging or other terminology issues. 136 The
TBT Agreement does not apply to SPS measures, and does not
13 7
actually require a country to adopt any technical regulations.
If Members do adopt technical regulations, however, the TBT
sets out certain rules. 138 Members are required to apply techni139
cal regulations on a national treatment and on an MFN basis.
When preparing technical regulations, Members have two additional obligations: (1) to ensure that their regulations are not
"prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade." That is,
technical regulations must be directed at "legitimate objectives"
and must not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill
those objectives; 140 and (2) to base technical regulations on relevant international standards, where they exist, unless these
standards would be ineffective or inappropriate to fulfill the le14 1
gitimate objectives pursued.
Like the SPS, the TBT has emerged as a non-GATT mechanism for balancing non-trade values in the WTO. 14 2 And, like

the SPS, the TBT balance is more trade-oriented than the GATT
balance. 143 The TBT Agreement has been raised in only two
cases, EC -Asbestos 14 4 and EC - Sardines.145 In the former, the
AB held that the regulation at issue was a technical regulation
but declined, due to the state of the record, to determine
whether the regulation violated the TBT.146 The AB was clear,
however, that the TBT constituted an independent set of obligations from those of the GATT, stating ".

..

the TBT Agreement

imposes obligations on Members that seem to be different from,

135. Id. Annex 1.
136. Id. Annex 1, cl. 1.
137. Compare SPS Agreement, supra note 79, with TBT Agreement, supra note
80.
138. See TBT Agreement, supra note 80, art. 2.
139. Id. art. 2.1.
140. Id. arts. 2.2-2.4, 4.1, Annex 3.
141. Id. arts. 2.4, 4.1, Annex 3.
142. See generally TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
143. Compare GATT, supra note 4, with SPS, supra note 79, and TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
144. See Asbestos, supra note 55, at 2.
145. EC - Trade Descriptionof Sardines, WT/DS231/ABR 44, World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Decisions 71 (adopted October 23, 2002) [hereinafter
Sardines].
146. Asbestos, supra note 55, paras. 82-83.
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and additional to, the obligations imposed on Members under
the GATT 1994."147

The Sardines case did go on to complete the analysis under
the TBT.14s The measure in issue was an EC regulation establishing common marketing standards for preserved sardines. 149
The regulation provided that only sardines from the species
Sardinapilchardus, commonly found in the Northern Atlantic,
could be labeled and marketed in the EC as "sardines." Peru
took issue with this regulation as it excluded the species Sardinops sagax, commonly found in the Eastern Pacific. A relevant
international standard (Codex Stan 94), jointly adopted by the
United Nations Codex Alimentarius Commission and the WHO,
addressed the term sardines, which it defined as comprising
twenty-one different species, including both pilchardus and sagax.150 The AB held that Codex Stan 94 was a relevant international standard (even though it had not been adopted by consensus) and that the EC had not used Codex Stan 94 as a basis for
its regulation. 151 The AB further held that Codex Stan 94 was
neither inappropriate nor ineffective to achieve the EC's stated
objectives of "market transparency, consumer protection and
fair competition." 152 The EC was therefore in breach of TBT Article 2.4.153
The Sardines case was probably not an inappropriate decision on the facts; there is a genuine case that, for labeling purposes, the two sardine species should be treated the same. Sardines illustrates, however, that one can succeed under the TBT
where one might have failed under the GATT.154 The TBT imports a free-standing requirement to base technical regulations
in any field-national security, public health, or environmental
protection--on international standards unless none exist or
those which do can be shown to be inappropriate or ineffective to
achieve the objectives pursued. 155 In this sense the TBT Agreement is a powerful vehicle of harmonization. 156 Unlike the SPS
Agreement, there is no option to disregard a relevant standard
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. para. 80.
Sardines, supranote 145, paras. 197, 233, 258, 290.
Id. paras. 2-3.
Id. para. 6.
Id. paras. 233, 258.
Id. para. 291.
Id. para. 315.
Compare GATT, supra note 4, with TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
TBT Agreement, supra note 80, art. 2.
See generally id.
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by conducting independent tests. 157
In sum, it might be said that the SPS applies the discipline
of science to those measures it covers, and the TBT applies the
discipline of international standards. 158 To return to the GMO
debate, if measures restricting market access to GMOcontaining products fall under the SPS, these will require scientific justification; 159 if such measures fall under the TBT, they
60
will have to be based on international standards.
2.

Intellectual Property and Investment in the WTO

a.

The TRIPS Agreement

The TRIPS Agreement provides an interesting contrast to
the SPS and TBT Agreements. 161 The SPS and TBT Agree62
ments are designed solely to protect international trade.
Conversely, the TRIPS Agreement is not designed to protect international trade at all.16 3 Rather, its purpose is to promote intellectual property (IP) rights and, if anything, to restrict international trade (although not more than necessary) where such
164
trade would infringe IP rights.
In other words, TRIPS is a WTO recognition of the intersection between free-trade values and other values. 165 The TRIPS
Agreement resolves this intersection by placing the protection of
certain intellectual property standards above the goal of unrestricted trade. 66 Although trade in pirated computer software
or generic pharmaceuticals may encourage competition and produce profits for some sectors of the world community, it may disincentivize invention and reduce profits in others.
It can be argued that secure intellectual property rights are
important for international trade. 167 Companies may be unwill-

157.
158.
80.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Cf. SPS Agreement, supra note 79, art. 3.3.
Compare SPS Agreement, supra note 79, with TBT Agreement, supra note
SPS Agreement, supranote 79, art. 3.3.
TBT Agreement, supra note 80, art. 2.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81.
SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, art. 7.
See generally id.
See id.

167.
See generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002).
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ing to supply IP products to countries which do not protect these
from piracy. Even if correct, this argument simply uses trade
effects instrumentally, to additionally support a value considered intrinsically important-that is, a high standard of property protection. In reality, the normative basis for TRIPS is exogenous to the free flow of international trade.
This can be seen in the different structure of the TRIPS
Agreement from that of the SPS and the TBT. 168 The latter two
agreements could be described as defensive because their sole
aim is reducing interference with the trade rules in GATT and
GATS.169 This means that-although they are concerned with
health measures and technical standards respectively-they do
not promote any particular values, or provide any minimum
standards. 70 This is somewhat peculiar as the very purpose of
adopting SPS measures or technical regulations is to promote
non-trade values, such as health protection, environmental
standards, consumer safety or national security. 171 Rather
ironically, the purpose of the SPS and TBT Agreements is to
curtail these non-trade values. 172 It would be entirely SPS and
TBT consistent for a Member to dispense with all health, environmental, safety regulations whatsoever.173 But it would be
inconsistent for that Member to base SPS measures on poor science, or TBT measures on standards which conflict with international consensus. 174 As defensive agreements, the SPS and
175
the TBT exist simply to straightjacket non-trade measures.
The TRIPS Agreement, on the other hand, could be described as progressive because it exists to increase the scope and
internal values of the WTO. 76 Its very purpose is to set new
minimum standards for IP protection. 177 Indeed, it goes fur168. Compare SPS Agreement, supra note 79, with TBT Agreement, supra note
80, and TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81.
169. See SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
170. See SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
171. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 79.
172. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note
80.
173. See SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80 (failing
to prescribe any minimum standard or floor for regulation in non-trade areas, setting only a maximum standard or ceiling).
174. Compare SPS Agreement, supra note 79, arts. 2.2, 3.3, with TBT Agreement, supra note 80, art. 2.4.
175. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note
80.
176. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81.
177. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, pmbl. ("Recognizing... the need for new
rules and disciplines concerning... (b) the provision of adequate standards and
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ther-no level of protection is too high to violate the TRIPS.
The Agreement even178 encourages Members to provide more rigorous IP protection.
Specifically, TRIPS contains the predictable relative obligations, such as national and MFN treatment for application of IP
protection. 179 It also contains a host of substantive obligations,
some incorporated from the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions.18 0 Chief among these are:
as well as
(1) to extend copyright protection to computer programs,
181
more traditional forms of literary or artistic creation;
(2) to provide a minimum level of copyright protection of 50 years from
the date 18of2 authorized publication (or, if no authorized publication,
making);
183
(3) to provide trademark protection for no less than seven years;

through indus(4) to provide protection for industrial designs either
184
trial design or patent law for no less than 10 years;
(5) to provide patent protection for any invention, whether products or
processes, for no less than 20 years. 185 Developing countries were
given a five year grace period, 186 but still had to provide a means to
file applications and interim marketing rights; 187 and
(6) to provide effective enforcement mechanisms, including criminal

principles concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual
property rights.").
178. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, art. 1.1 ('Members shall give effect to
the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement.").
179. See id. arts. 3-4.
180. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
available at http://www.wipo.org/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm (last visited Jan. 28,
2004); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/
clea/docs/enlwo/wo001en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); Rome Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations,
Oct. 26, 1961, available athttp://www.wipo.intclea/docs/en/wo/wo024en.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2004).
181. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, arts. 9-10.
182. Id. art. 12.
183. Id. art. 18.
184. Id. arts. 26-27.
185. Id. arts. 27, 33.
186. Id. art. 65.
187. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, art. 70.
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prosecution, for infringement of certain TRIPS obligations. 18 8

The TRIPS Agreement contains a number of derogation
provisions. 8 9 The most general provision is also probably the
least effective because it permits public health, nutrition and
otherwise public interest measures, but only provided such
measures are already consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. 190
There are, however, a number of other provisions which permit
states to control abuse of IP rights and to limit IP rights where
there would be no prejudice. 191 Certain activities are also ex192
cluded from TRIPS' scope.
TRIPS has proven effective in drawing awareness to intellectual property issues. To date, six decided cases have involved
significant contested issues under TRIPS. 193 The most controversial dispute covered by TRIPS-the supply of HIV/AIDS
medicines to South Africa-was resolved through informal negotiations rather than formal procedures. 194 In each of the six
cases determined under the DSU, the defendant has lost on at
least one substantive ground. These cases illustrate that the
TRIPS obligations are wide-ranging and not easily avoided.
To quickly sketch the issues and results, Canada lost a dispute initiated by the United States on the basis that its Patent
Act provided only seventeen, and not twenty, years of protection
to applications filed before 1989.195 In a related case, Canada's
188. Id. arts. 41-67.
189. See id. arts. 8.1, 13, 26.2, 27.3, 30, 40.1.
190. Id.
191. For instance, there is flexibility to control abuse of intellectual property
rights which may adversely affect international trade or international technology
transfer. Id. art. 8.2. There is also some scope to control, through competition law,
certain IP practices. Id. art. 40.1. Limited exceptions are permitted for both copyright and patent issues, where these cause no prejudice or interference with the IP
holder's rights. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, arts. 13, 30.
192. Some inventions with public interest implications may be excluded from
patentability. Id. arts. 27.2, 27.3. There is also a significant carve-out for national
security. Id. art. 73.
193. See EC-Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english
/tratop-e/dispue/1555d.pdf; Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS 54,55,59,64/R (Dec. 7, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/eng
lishltratop-e/invest e/ds54-15.doc (two other cases tangentially raising TRIPS issues).
194. See Charlotte Denny & James Meek, Drug Giants Made to Swallow Bitter
Pill: Global Opinion Won in South Africa, But Will it Triumph When the US Fights
Brazil's Cheap Aids Medicine?, GUARDIAN, Apr. 19, 2001, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4172158,00.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
195. Canada - Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/AB/R (Oct. 12, 2000),
available at http://www.wto.org.
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Patent Act was also found to violate TRIPS by permitting the
use of a patented product during the patent term to "stockpile"
derived articles intended for sale after expiration of that term.
This was held not to be a "limited exception" within the meaning
of Article 30.196 India lost two separate cases because it did not
have a "mailbox" filing system for receiving patent applications
and did not provide interim exclusive marketing rights. 197 The
United States unsuccessfully defended regulations which permitted small businesses from playing broadcasted performances
to customers on the basis that this was not a limited exception
to the copyright-holders' exclusive right to broadcast. 198 Finally,
in Havana Club, the AB held that a U.S. measure denying the
right of Cuban nationals to apply for and hold trademarks partially violated the TRIPS' national treatment and MFN
clauses. 19 9
TRIPS is a carefully crafted agreement with a number of
derogation provisions seeking to provide flexibility. 200 It should,
however, be appreciated that the results reached will often be
different than those which would have been reached under the
GATT. Canada's stockpiling case is an example of strong IP
rights restraining an otherwise legitimate trade practice.
b. The TRIMS Agreement
The TRIMS Agreement is slightly harder to classify. 20 1 On
one hand, it sets out positive rules prohibiting certain trade
policies often tied to investment incentives, such as trade bal202
ancing, export performance and local-content requirements.
On the other, TRIMS purports merely to reflect the obligations
inherent in GATT, Articles III (national treatment) and XI
196. Canada Patent Protection of PharmaceuticalProducts, WT/DS114/R (Apr.
7, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org.
197. India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products (EC Complaint), WT/DS79R (Sept. 22,
1998), available at
http://www.wto.org; India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural
Chemical Products (U.S. Complaint), WT/DS50/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org; see generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, art. 70.
198. US - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTIDS160/R (July 27, 2000),
available at http://www.wto.org. Note that the relevant provisions were Articles 913 of the Berne Convention. Supra note 180. These provisions were incorporated
through TRIPS. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, art. 9.1.
199. US - Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
200. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81.
201. TRIMS Agreement, supra note 82.
202. Id.
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(quantitative restrictions). 203
Accordingly, TRIMS' positive
rules are in the form of illustrative examples of these GATT
provisions. 204 Technically, the illustrative examples in Part I of
the Annex probably exceed the rules which can be formally derived from GATT Article 111.205 For instance, a Member deciding to impose export performance requirements on all domestic
companies as well as foreign companies would violate TRIMS,
but not GATT Article 111.206 For the most part, however, it
would be accurate to describe TRIMS as a declaratory agree07
ment which only modestly extends the reach of the GATT.2
For this reason, the analysis below will focus on the SPS, TBT
and TRIPS Agreements.
IV. A BALANCE ALTERED: WHY THE WTO IS NOT READY
FOR HARMONIZATION
What does the above survey of WTO harmonization agreements reveal about the "constitution" of the WTO? There are
two important points. First, all WTO harmonization agreements-whether defensive or progressive-alter the contractual
balance created by the core trade agreements, GATT and GATS,
because they create additional and independent obligations for
Members. Proving that a measure does not breach any GATT or
GATS obligation, or that it is saved by the general derogation
provisions, is therefore insufficient to ensure WTO compliance.
This point may seem self-evident, but it is important. If one
takes the GATT and GATS as striking a fundamental bargain
between trade and non-trade interests, then every free-standing
addition to the WTO risks altering this bargain.
Second, there is a key conceptual difference between progressive and defensive harmonization agreements. This has not
been clearly recognized in the literature. David Leebron has attempted to distinguish between several broad types of harmonization. 20 8 The main distinctions Leebron identifies are: (a) spe203.

Id.

art. 2.2 (providing that the Annex is merely "[a]n illustrative list of

TRIMS which are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for
in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT and the obligation of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994").
204. See id.

205.

See supra note 4, art. III.

206. Compare TRIMS Agreement, supra note 82, Annex 2(c), with GATT, supra
note 4, art. III, cl. (1), (4).

207.
208.

Compare GATT, supra note 4, with TRIMS Agreement, supra note 82.
David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes:An Analysis of Harmoniza-
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cific rules which regulate characteristics or performance; (b)
general policy objectives which set broad standards; (c) agreed
principles which influence or constrain factors taken into account in making specific rules; and (d) harmonization of institutional structures and procedures. 209 Using only this taxonomy,
one might conclude that progressive harmonization is often of
types (a) or (b)-in that positive rules or policies are specified;
whereas defensive harmonization is often of types (c) or (d)-in
that certain factors or decision-making processes are prohibited.
Leebron's taxonomy does not, however, provide the full picture. Leebron's distinctions focus closely on the external form of
harmonization measures but not on their underlying purpose.
Leebron loosely defines harmonization as "making the regulatory requirements or government policies of similar jurisdictions
identical, or at least more similar."2 10 The unanswered question, though, is "why is this convergence sought"? To answer it,
one needs to recognize the important difference between harmonization sought in an area to promote common values in respect of that area, and harmonization sought in an area to protect common values in a different area from regulatory
encroachment.
In the first situation, the area affected is directly regulated
on the basis of explicit decisions about that area. In the second,
the areas affected are indirectly regulated due to explicit decisions about another area entirely. Thus, trade policy comes to
make health policy by omission. For the WTO, this difference
can be explained in terms of institutional power loci. Progressive harmonization agreements shift the institutional locus of
the WTO from a uni-polar concentration on trade values to a
multi-polar balancing of multiple values. The mark of a progressive harmonization agreement is the stipulation of minimum standards with respect to the non-trade value in issue.
Figure 2 depicts the way in which TRIPS has expanded the substantive scope of the WTO.

tion Claims, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 44 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E.
Hudec eds., 1996).
209. Id. at 43-46.
210. Id. at 43.
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Figure 2: TRIPS in the WTO

Defensive harmonization, on the other hand, does not seek
to promote new values in the WTO. Rather, its function is to
better protect the trade values at the core of GATT and GATS.
The mark of a defensive harmonization agreement is the intent
to restrict, rather than promote, the non-trade value in issue.
With the SPS, the focus is on requiring scientific evidence supporting SPS measures; with the TBT, the focus is on requiring
technical regulations to be based on international standards.
Conceptually, defensive harmonization agreements expand the
reach of trade values into other areas through procedural restrictions and conditions on measures promoting non-trade values. Figure 3 illustrates.
SPS and TBT
Other Non-Trade Values

protection

~Free

and non-

~services

discriminatory
trade in goods and

Figure 3: The SPS and TBT in the WTO
This Article argues that the WTO is not yet ready for either
progressive or defensive harmonization-though for different
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reasons. In explaining those reasons, it is convenient to address
defensive harmonization first.
A. DEFENSIVE HARMONIZATION MEASURES: ADDING
OBLIGATIONS BUT No GOALS
The flaw of the WTO defensive harmonization agreements
is that they do not seek to achieve anything that the GATT and
the GATS do not already seek to achieve. They simply seek the
same goals in a more rigorous manner. Their "additive" structure, however, upsets the careful balance between GATT obligations and GATT Article XX in two ways. First, although the
SPS and TBT merely seek to promote compliance with the
GATT, it is not necessary to establish a breach of the GATT for
them to apply. 211 The SPS applies to all measures which "affect
trade;" 2 12 the TBT applies to all technical regulations relating to
products. 213 Thus, the reach of the TBT and SPS Agreements is
wider than the GATT.214 On the other hand, it is no defense to a
charge of violating the SPS or TBT to demonstrate compliance
with GATT Article XX.215 So the exceptions to SPS and TBT
discipline are narrower than the GATT.216 The margin of appreciation contained in the GATT is therefore squeezed from
both ends because the SPS and the TBT are leaner, more ag217
gressive and entirely independent regimes.
The notion that GATT compliance is not a defense has obvious potential to alter results. A good example is the Australian
Salmon case. 2 18 Under the GATT, Australia might have argued
that a requirement of heat treatment for foreign salmon, but not
of domestic salmon, was not in breach of GATT Article III asdue to foreign risks of disease-the two were not like products. 21 9 This is essentially the argument which prevailed in EC

211. See SPS Agreement, supranote 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
212. See SPS Agreement, supra note 79, art. 1.1. The SPS applies to all measures affecting trade either directly or indirectly. Id.
213. See TBT Agreement, supra note 80, Annex 1 (defining "technical regulation").
214. Compare GATT, supra note 4, with SPS Agreement, supra note 79, and
TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
215. See SPS Agreement, supranote 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
216. See SPS Agreement, supranote 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
217. SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supra note 80.
218. Salmon, supra note 96.
219. Id. This case can be analyzed in different ways. If the Australian measure
is not conceptualized as a requirement of heat treatment but as an import ban of
fresh, frozen or chilled salmon, the measure would violate GATT Article XI. But
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Asbestos. 220 Note that the Asbestos case, which was a success
for the EU, avoided TBT scrutiny even though the TBT applied. 221 The result for the measure might well have been different if the AB had chosen to complete the panel's analysis.
-

Another example is the Hormones case. 222 Absent the SPS,

one might have expected the EU to make a more convincing case
from GATT Article XX(b); however, the EU failed not because
the measure was more trade-restrictive than necessary, but because it was not properly supported by science. 223 If the issue of
GMOs is resolved through the SPS, then it will not even be possible to mount a defense to any particular GMO product based
on public morality under GATT Article XX(a). 224 The SPS and
the GATT are entirely independent regimes. 225
Some have argued that this disconnect is not problematic.
In particular, Robert Howse has argued that the SPS requirement of scientific evidence should be understood as simply part
of the democratic process of shaping a nation's values and
choices. 226 Instead of usurping democratic choice, the SPS
sharpens the rationality of that choice. This is undoubtedly true
to some extent. But, while rational decision-making in a democracy is laudable, Howse's argument does not engage the troubling double-standard at the heart of defensive harmonization.
While health and environmental agendas must be carefully justified and drafted with an eye to non-binding international
standards, trade and economic agendas are not subject to the
same discipline. There are sanctions for making "faulty" health
or environmental regulations, but there are no sanctions for deciding not to regulate at all. Although cases so far are limited,
the very threat of a protracted dispute challenging the procedure, science, rationality or international basis of measures, has
real potential to chill intersecting regulation.
Lori Wallach has written of defensive harmonization:
NAFTA and the WTO "non-tariff' provisions are based on certain underlying premises, among them: domestic health, safety, and environmental policies must be designed in the "least trade restrictive" maneven such a breach is not necessary to invoke the SPS.
220.
221.
222.

Asbestos, supranote 55.
Id.
Hormones, supra note 97.

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
This is a possible avenue for a defense of trade-restrictive GMO measures.
See GATT, supra note 4; SPS Agreement, supra note 79.
Robert Howse, Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on

Trial at the World Trade Organization,98 MICH. L. REV. 2329 (2000).
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ner and national laws and standards should be standardized internationally so as to maximize economic efficiency in cross-border trade.
This process of global standardization
has been dubbed "harmoniza227
tion" by the corporations that favor it.

This summary is not strictly accurate, as the SPS does not
228
require standardization so much as scientific justification.
But the concept that, through defensive harmonization, trade
values influence, and thus chill, non-trade regulation is important. Of course it is prudent to prevent non-tariff barriers from
undermining the WTO system, and what looks like regulatory
diversity can in fact be a disguised restriction on international
trade. 229 But this is not a new problem and was anticipated and
addressed through the GATT contractual balance. 230 If a nontariff barrier does not breach GATT Articles I, III or XI, or can
be saved by Article XX (which denies protection to "disguised restriction[s] on international trade"), should that non-tariff barrier-which clearly seeks to promote some non-trade goal-be
fairly subject to further scrutiny?
The best response to Howse is this: that the effect of the
SPS and TBT is to make technocratic advances in the protection
of trade values only by threatening the substantive protection of
non-trade values. 23 1 Consider the future cases of pesticides, disease control measures, unsafe building or manufacturing materials, child equipment safety standards or cosmetics labeling regimes. What may have succeeded under the GATT may fail
under the SPS or TBT.232
Increasing the rationality of democratic decision-making is
fine, but not if a rationality criterion is applied to all values except for free trade. If applied selectively, the many policies subject to the criterion will be outflanked by the few policies free
from it, which creates imbalance. More importantly, such selective application is a result of value encroachment. Consensus
on the importance of trade values at the WTO, but not on health
or environmental values, has led the WTO to try to regulate
health and environmental policies from a purely trade-oriented

227. Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization:The
WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 40 U. KAN. L. REV.
807, 829 (2002).

228. SPS Agreement, supra note 79.
229. See Howse, supranote 226, at 2331.
230. See GATT, supra note 4, art. IILA (regarding the contractual balance).
231. See SPS Agreement, supra note 79; TBT Agreement, supranote 80.
232. Compare GATT, supra note 4, with SPS Agreement, supra note 79, and
TBT Agreement, supranote 80.
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perspective. In an interdependent, post-club model world, this
is dangerous and illegitimate. This is so because defensive
harmonization measures are conceptually empty. Because they
do not proceed from a position of shared values in the areas they
regulate, they risk doing damage to those areas in order to fur23 3
ther ulterior motives.
Returning to the Biosafety Protocol, 2 34 which is an example
of progressive SPS harmonization, underlines this point. The
Protocol seeks to harmonize certain regulatory measures so as
to protect biodiversity and health. 235 That is, the measures it
affects, namely environmental and health regulation, pursue
the same goals the Protocol seeks to advance. Accordingly, the
Protocol requires comprehensive notification, assessment and
management procedures designed to reduce risks in the transboundary movement of GMOs. 236 The point is that the Protocol
regulates health and environmental measures from inside the
same epistemic community, using the same values. 237 In contrast, the SPS regulates from outside, using different values.
For these reasons, Joanne Scott's suggestion that the WTO
should learn from the "new approach" to harmonization in the
EU is simply misplaced. 238 This new approach lays down essential requirements for particular areas by directives, but then
233. Indeed, for this reason defensive harmonization does not appear to meet
the "goals" of harmonization suggested by Leebron. See Procrustes,supra note 208,
at 49 (providing a concrete example of harmonization: "[flor example, harmonization
of food safety rules creates a single policy space for food safety"); Jagdish Bhagwati,
The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations, in FAIR TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION 42 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Both
Leebron and Bhagwati suggest that an important goal of harmonization is "fairness." Id. at 42; Procrustes,supra note 208, at 18. This is not what the SPS does.
Rather than a policy space, it creates a policy "straitjacket."
234. Protocol, supra note 120.
235. Id.
236. Id. arts. 15-19, 33.
237. See id. art. 2, cl (4). This article contains the mark of progressive harmonization, a no-maximum standards clause very similar to Article 1(1) of TRIPS:
Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the right of a
Party to take action that is more protective of the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity than that called for in this Protocol, provided that such action is consistent with the objective and the provisions of
this Protocol and is in accordance with that Party's other obligations under
international law.
Id.
238. Joanne Scott, International Trade and Environmental Governance: What
the WTO Could (But Probably Won't) Learn From the EU (Apr. 17, 2003) (unpublished paper, presented to the Columbia Law Faculty) (on file with the Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade).
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permits flexibility as to the actual means of compliance with
those requirements. 239 Members may use certain approved
standards (and are incentivized to do so by a presumption of
compliance) but are also free to achieve the essential requirements by other means. This is a good system; however, it requires progressive integration agreements which actively seek to
promote non-trade values. That is the nature of most EU directives. The essential requirements are actually minimum standards in non-trade areas: such as health, consumer protection or
safety standards. 24 0 The directives are intended to balance the
non-trade objective with the free movement principle.
This regime is not applicable to the SPS and TBT Agreements which do not prescribe any essential requirements because they do not promote any non-trade values. The WTO does
not provide minimum standards of health protection, or specify
minimum levels of technical regulations relating to, say, child
car restraints. This difference in harmonization underlines the
gulf between the WTO and the EU. The EU is moving closer to
being a polity and already has a range of shared values which go
239. See id.; see also New Approach, Directives and Standards, at http:/www.
newapproach.org/Directives/DirectiveList.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); European
Commission, The New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standardisation Harmonised Standards, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/stan
dardization/harmstds/reflist.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (giving a list of explanation of such directives).
240. See Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
3 December 2001 on General Product Safety, art. 3(i), 2001 O.J. (L 11/4) (requiring
that "Producers shall be obliged to place only safe products on the market" and sets
minimum standards, including labeling and routine checks, for determining product
safety); Council Directive 88/378/EEC of 3 May 1988 on the Approximation of the
Laws of the Member States Concerning the Safety of Toys, art. 2, cl. 1, 1988 O.J. (L
187) (providing that: "[t]oys may be placed on the market only if they do not jeopardize the safety and/or health of users or third parties when they are used as intended
or in a foreseeable way, bearing in mind the normal behaviour of children"); European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on Packaging
and Packaging Waste, art. 1, cl. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 365) (attempting, by a combination
of essential requirements and guaranteed market access for firms which meet these
essential requirements, to balance the twin goals of environmental and trade protection). Article 1(1) provides:
This Directive aims to harmonize national measures concerning the management of packaging and packaging waste in order, on the one hand, to
prevent any impact thereof on the environment of all Member States as
well as of third countries or to reduce such impact, thus providing a high
level of environmental protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure the
functioning of the internal market and to avoid obstacles to trade and distortion and restriction of competition within the Community.
Id. art. 1, cl. 1. Article 6 sets minimum targets of recovery and recycling of waste.
Id. art. 6.
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beyond trade. 241 At present,
WTO Members agree on little other
242
than free trade principles.
B. POSITIVE HARMONIZATION MEASURES: BACK TO
CONSTITUTUTIONALISM (IN THE SECOND SENSE)

Professor Scott's recommendation, 243 then, is posited on the
WTO developing sophisticated progressive integration agreements which do promote non-trade values. But this suggestion
opens a whole new can of worms. 244 True, substantive agreements are one way for the WTO to move from the club model to
an organization which actively recognizes and promotes nontrade values. Opponents of TRIPS might consider it the very
model that "social cause" WTO agreements, promoting labor,
health and environmental rights, might follow. It prescribes
minimum standards for a non-trade value and seeks to reconcile
tensions this might create with core trade values of the WTO.
But is the WTO really the right forum for the positive international regulation of non-trade values? At present, it practically does the job by default, so one argument would be to turn
the de facto into the de jure. However, this requires not only the
exercise of power, but the exercise of power cloaked in authority-and the WTO is still some distance away from acquiring
24 5
the necessary authority.
The preliminary difficulty is that values which are positively incorporated in the WTO assume a great priority over
values which are not so incorporated. This can be seen in the
showdown over TRIPS and the provision of AIDS medicine.
Without TRIPS, it would have been very difficult even to argue
that intellectual property rights in universal twenty-year patents trumped a continent's right to address the most serious
health epidemic of modern times. 246 This will arise each time
241. See Michael Trebilcock, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity 4
(Nov. 8, 2002) (unpublished paper, delivered to the Third EnviReform Conference)
(on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
242. See generally supra note 44. Since its inception in 1994, the WTO has faced
a deadlock in expanding its agenda.
243. Scott, supranote 238.
244. That is, it involves substantively expanding the scope of the WTOsomething about which there is massive disagreement and which brought down the
Ministerial Conferences in Seattle and Cancun. See supra note 44.
245. See Howse & Nicholaidis, supra note 21; Howse & Nicholaidis, supra note
24; supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the results of Seattle and Cancun).

246.

Although, as stated, this case was settled and not resolved under the DSU.
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new values are selectively incorporated into the WTO. For instance, if environmental rights are added and labor rights are
not, then we can expect to see ecological protection gain ground
against rights to work and unionize.
The only solution to the disparity is for the WTO to assume
control over a broad range of non-trade values, and this, of
course, leads straight back to the second of the constitutionalism
questions 24 7 -should the WTO evolve into a type of world economic organization 248 or even world government?
Most would agree that this shift is neither politically feasible nor desirable. Joseph Weiler has pointed out that there are
two types of legitimacy: formal and social. 249 Even if the WTO
formally assumed jurisdiction over a range of other matters, this
would not provide it with a polity or demos to govern legitimately. 250 It is hard to imagine that WTO Members-or, more
importantly, their citizens-would accept the WTO as the sole
and proper authority in difficult balancing cases; especially
when these cases uphold free trade over environmental, health
or human rights values. 251 This is not to mention the threat of
institutional bias.
More pragmatically, it is doubtful whether the fundamental
WTO discipline of trade sanctions is an appropriate or useful
means of addressing complex problems in developing countries.
As Bhagwati has pointed out, a WTO labor code prohibiting
child labor is not likely to actually end the practice. 25 2 To really
change social conditions requires painstaking grassroots work
coupled with opportunities for new social ordering. The WTO is,
unfortunately, too blunt an instrument to effect such changes.
If a poor country which does not prohibit child labor is then subject to trade sanctions, it will become even poorer. It is therefore doubtful that this approach will ultimately improve the
conditions on the ground.
Finally, a positive integration/constitutional approach does
not seem a very efficient solution to the problem of balancing
See supra notes 34, 182.
247. That is, should the WTO seek to become an overarching constitutional system? See supra Part I.
248. Bronkers, supra note 20, at 55.
249. WEILER, supra note 16, at 80.
250. See generally Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 21; Howse & Nicholaidis, supra note 24; Lindseth, supra note 23; Cottier, supra note 20.
251. See generally Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 21; Howse & Nicholaidis, supra note 24; Lindseth, supra note 23; Cottier, supra note 20.
252. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 79 (2002).
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values because it would marginalize many existing institutions.
The International Labor Organization (ILO), for instance, would
become somewhat redundant. 253 Even if the WTO ultimately
acquired the social legitimacy to enforce further non-trade values, the best vehicle for this would surely be through linkages to
the rules and machinery of other regimes.
But no mistake should be made. If non-trade values-such
as labor standards-are incorporated into the WTO by reference, then the result is the same as if they were directly included in a WTO agreement: such standards become directly enforceable in the WTO. In either case, breaching labor rights is
breaching the WTO. In other words, linkages which transform
non-WTO values into enforceable WTO obligations use nontrade values as a sword backed by WTO discipline. These linkages do not solve the problem of WTO legitimacy; quite the contrary. They increase the power of the WTO, but in a nontransparent manner.
V. SOME THOUGHTS: SHIELDS, STANDSTILLS, TIE-INS
AND CARVE-OUTS
A.

NON-TRADE VALUES AS SHIELDS AGAINST WTO DISCIPLINE

Does this mean that, until it acquires a broader polity, the
WTO should refrain from making linkages with other regimes?
No. There is a middle ground; linkage-based negative integration. Non-trade values in the WTO should be developed for use
as a shield against WTO discipline; but they should not be incorporated as a sword backed by WTO discipline.
The concept of non-trade values as a shield helps protect
the contractual balance of the WTO, which in turn preserves
John Ruggie's compact of embedded liberalism. 2 54 It may ultimately preserve the future of the WTO. By the use of "nontrade values as a shield," this Article means that attention
should be given to ensure that, where appropriate, non-trade
values can be invoked as defenses against the trade-liberalizing
aims of the GATT. The main shield mechanism is of course the
general derogation provisions of GATT Article XX and GATS
253. See generally International Labour Organization, Official Website, at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (containing information
on the organization's objectives and activities).
254. See supra notes 40, 43.
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Article XIV.255
Discussion of linkages has led to a number of different proposals for better balancing of the WTO with non-trade values.
Aside from constitutionalization, there have been calls for the
WTO to foster a democratic image through increased transparency and accountability and to cooperate better with other re2 56
gimes.
These suggestions are sensible. The WTO should consult
widely with other regimes. The WTO should also become more
transparent 257 and amicus curiae briefs should be routinely accepted. 258 The more voice given to disparate opinions and constituencies, the greater the WTO's legitimacy to address the
range of issues which intersect with trade. 259 A more tangible
way to approach issues lacking consensus is non-mandatory
plurilateral agreements between like-minded Members. The
Agreement on Government Procurement is a good example. 260
Plurilateral agreements help to disaggregate the different constituencies in the WTO and encourage gradual change. Such
agreements should, however, not be excepted from the MFN
principle with respect to non-signatories. Plurilateral agreements should be a means of encouraging reciprocal concessions
in mutually advantageous areas, not a means of forcing compli-

255. This analysis is slightly simplified of course. One could also point to jurisprudence regarding "like products" under GATT Article III. GATT, supra note 4,
art. III. As discussed earlier, the Asbestos case is a good example of balancing conducted at the breach phase. Supra note 55.
256. See generally Krajewski, supra note 17; Christophe Bellmann & Richard
Gerster, Accountability in the World Trade Organization, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 6
(1996); Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, ProtectingHuman Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization (Rights and Democracy, 2000),
http://www.ichrdd.calframe2.iphtml?langue=O&menu=mO7&urlpage=store/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
257. It should be noted, however, that the WTO was recently ranked well for
transparency and accountability by the Global Accountability Report. See World
Trade Organization, WTO Gets High Marks for Accountability, Transparency (Feb.
11, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/newsO3_e/global-account_
report11feb03_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
258. See Shrimp/Turtles, supra note 74, paras. 107-08 (discussing the current
status of amicus curiae briefs before Panels or the AB). See generally DAVID
PALMETER & PETROS MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WTO: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, chs. 4-6 (1999).

259. This argument has been made many times. For an example, see Krajewski,
supra note 17 (especially note 11 therein).
260. Agreement on Government Procurement, Jan. 1, 1981, WTO Agreement,
Annex 4, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-elegal-e/tokyo-gpr-e.pdf
(last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
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ance with new values in the WTO arena. 261 Another laudable
harmonization tool is voluntary Mutual Recognition Agreements
(MRAs).26 2 Such agreements are to be encouraged, but the
shared value-balancing they entail should be a decision for
Member countries, and not forced by WTO discipline.
While these measures are admirable, they are relatively
soft proposals. Other proposals are needed to more immediately
restore the GATT contractual balance, and such proposals do exist. In particular, the concept of WTO subsidiarity to other regimes points in a more promising direction. 26 3 Based on EU jurisprudence, this concept seeks to ensure that other values and
procedures will prevail over the WTO apparatus where appropriate. 264 This concept dovetails well with the concept of nontrade values being used as a shield to WTO discipline.
B.

HOW TO CREATE EFFECTIVE SHIELDS: SUBSIDIARITY IN THE

WTO CONTEXT
Below are some practical proposals for change, based on
three key mechanisms: "standstills," "tie-ins" and "carve-outs."
A standstill is where integration efforts cease completely. A tiein is where different agreements or regimes are explicitly linked
to each other to create an organic framework of legal obligations. A carve-out is where some agreements or regimes are explicitly excepted from each other to create a clear hierarchy of
legal obligations. The WTO Agreement could be improved by
more extensive use of each of these mechanisms.
An initial suggestion is that the WTO should declare a total
standstill on both progressive and defensive harmonization
measures. Such a standstill is necessary until, if ever, the WTO
acquires sufficient legitimacy to move its locus of balance from
trade issues to a comprehensive economic (or even global)
agenda. Cooperation, transparency, plurilateral agreements
and MRAs are ways for the WTO to build towards such legiti261.

For an extension of this argument, see Steve Charnowitz, Rethinking WTO

Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (2001).

262. See generally George Bermann, Regulatory CooperationBetween the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 933
(1996); James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to
U.S. Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957 (1999).

263. See Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 24 (discussing WTO subsidiarity);
Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, "Subsidiarity"in the WTO Context From a Legal Perspective, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

JOHN H. JACKSON (Marco Bronkers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
264. Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 24; Bourgeois, supra note 263.
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macy.
With regard to defensive harmonization, the key problem is
that the existing agreements, SPS and TBT, are not properly
linked to the GATT Agreement whose aims they purport to further. As matters stand, the SPS and TBT destabilize the institutional balance of GATT and GATS by permitting successful
WTO actions against potentially trade-restrictive measures to
succeed without proof of GATT or GATS breach, and without
opportunity to invoke the general derogation provisions.
The solution is to properly tie the SPS and the TBT to the
GATT and GATS Agreements. The SPS Preamble flirts with
this idea, recording the Members' intentions as, inter alia:
desiring therefore to elaborate rules for the application of the prophytosanivisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or265
tary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).
...

However, the SPS has not been interpreted consistently
with this intention. 266 Instead, it and the TBT are regarded
(and, one must acknowledge, generally drafted) as a series of
additional and independent obligations. At the very least, both
the SPS and the TBT should be amended to make it clear that
they do merely elaborate rules for the application of GATT Article XX, and GATS Article XIV. This would mean that their provisions cannot be invoked absent a proven breach of a primary
GATT or GATS obligation.
Even if this is done, there is still the problem that their requirements effectively restrict the scope of the general derogation provisions, and therefore upset the contractual balance.
One option to consider is complete repeal. Less radically, a possible solution would be to tie the SPS to the only obviously rele267
vant limb of the derogation provision: GATT Article XX(b).
This would allow Members to defend an SPS measure on other
grounds using GATT Article XX and would only make the SPS
Agreement relevant if the chosen defense was GATT Article
XX(b). The SPS would then be a shield, and not a sword.
This refinement is more difficult in the case of the TBT because, unlike SPS measures, TBT regulations can have any
number of conceivable purposes. Instead, thought could be
265.

SPS Agreement, supranote 79, pmbl.

266.

See Salmon, supra note 96; Hormones, supra note 97; Varietals, supra note

98. Each of these AB decisions treated the SPS as if it were an entirely freestanding obligation. See id.
267. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX.
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given to relaxing the requirement to use international standards
as a basis for regulation. 268 Although this requirement can be
avoided if the international standards are "ineffective or inappropriate," the Sardines case has shown that this is a high hurdle. 269 A better solution would be to use the SPS language in relation to standards and simply create a rebuttable presumption
that measures based on international standards are consistent
with the GATT (and GATS)-or, more formally, saved by GATT
Article XX or GATS Article XIV.2 7 0 This is really a micro instance of the EU "new approach." 271 The fundamental test for
compliance would be the "not more trade-restrictive than necessary" test from the general derogation provisions. 272 If this can
be met without reliance on international standards, that should
be acceptable. International standards could then be simply a
shield to ease the process and the burden of proof.
These suggestions will more effectively tie the SPS and the
TBT to the fundamental bargain of the GATT and the GATS.
But what of this bargain? Should it be reconsidered? Yes. The
general derogation provisions, while workable, are not adequate
to meet the challenge of the linkages created (by omission)
through the WTO's preeminence. For one thing, consideration
should be given to the substantive matters listed in the derogation provisions. The absence of labor and human rights provisions generally should be reassessed. These should, in a modern
world, be proper reasons for derogating from WTO discipline.
The EU generalized system of preferences is presently raising
such issues, with India challenging the system before a WTO
Panel. 273 It is not satisfactory that the EU should have to argue
that its sensitivities to labor and human rights fall within the
exceptions for "public morals" or "human animal or plant life or
274
health."
268. TBT Agreement, supra note 80, art. 2.4.
269. See supra note 143.
270. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XX; GATS, supra note 47, art. XIV.
271. See supra notes 226-227.
272. See generally supra Part III.A; see also supra note 77.
273. At the time of writing, the Panel decision had been provided to the parties
but not published. Informal reports claim that the Panel upheld India's claim. See
Chakravarthi Raghavan, India Wins Dispute on GSP Against EU, HINDU, Sept. 9,
2003, available at http://www.hindu.com/2003l09/10/stories/ 2003091002371600.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2004). See European Union, Generalized System of Preferences, at http://www.eurunion.orgllegislat/gsp/gsp.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004)
(containing information regarding the EU GSP system).
274. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(a), (b) respectively. See generally supra Part
III.A.
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The question then becomes, how to create a carve-out for
labor and human rights that is not excessively broad? One answer is to directly refer to relevant international agreements,
such as ILO Standard 182,27 5 The United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of the Child276 and the United Nations Declara277
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
The exact agreements that should be chosen is a topic for another article. What can be said now is that these, and/or other
like agreements considered sufficiently important, should be excepted from WTO discipline through a provision which states
that nothing in the GATT or GATS is intended to prevent Members from performing positive obligations under those specified
agreements. The obligations in such agreements can then be
used as shields to proceedings claiming breach of the WTO.
This approach could also be extended into the environmental arena. Indeed, this is one area in which a rethink is
sorely needed. The WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment has suggested that disputes under a Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) will be excepted from WTO discipline in the case that all parties to the dispute are signatories to
that MEA.278 But this conclusion is doubtful because it seems to

be inconsistent with Article 23.1 of the DSU which stipulates
the DSB as the exclusive forum for WTO violations. In reality,
the Committee's proposal will only be workable if actions taken
under the MEA at issue are specifically excepted from WTO discipline. If they are, then a defendant can raise the MEA as a
conclusive defense or shield against a WTO proceeding. The legality of the action can then be determined under the MEA.
A system of specific carve-outs for other international
agreements would adversely affect the strength of the WTO. To
the extent that the WTO presently and specifically overrides
certain human, labor or environmental rights, its power would
be restrained. This Article has argued that such a redistribu275. ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibitionand Immediate Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, International Labor Organization, 38 I.L.M. 1207
(June 17, 1999). See generally, Matthew T. Mitro, Outlawing the Trade in Child Labor Products; Why the GATT Article XX Health Exception Authorizes Unilateral
Sanctions, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1223 (2002).
276. G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/25, 28 J.L.M.
1448 (1989).

277. G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Agenda Item 58, U.N. Doc. A/6181,
5 I.L.M. 350 (1966).
278. See Electronic Commerce, available at http://www.wto.org/englishIthewto e
/whatise/tife/bey4_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (giving the official summary of
the Committee's position).
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tion of power is a good thing, but the implications should not be
exaggerated. To the extent that a Member's justification for its
action is not founded on a specifically excepted international obligation, the WTO would still prevail. Simply noting by way of
defense that the measure in question related to, say, labor standards would not be sufficient-the carve-out should only except
actions positively required by the specified agreement. In addition, the AB would have to be alert to spurious defenses, but
there is no reason why this approach would not improve the
balance struck at present. Indeed, this is precisely how Article
104 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is
drafted, 279 and few complaints have yet been raised about it.
CONCLUSION
In a vast field of international institutions, the WTO is preeminent. It has-particularly through careful AB decisionsgenerally wielded its significant power with restraint and responsibility. But, judicial finesse cannot cover indefinitely for
institutional shortcomings. The WTO has a number of shortcomings which must be addressed because, although the club
model theory of international regimes is still current, the reality
is that international institutions and regimes today are linked.
In practical terms, the linkage is hierarchical and the WTO is on
top.
This Article has argued that the WTO's basic bargaincarefully drafted positive trade obligations balanced by broad

279. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 14, 1993, art. 104, 107 Stat.
2057, 32 I.L.M. 289. Article 104, entitled "Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements," provides:
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set out in:
a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended June
22, 1979,
b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done
at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990,
c) the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done at Basel, March 22, 1989, on
its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and the United States, or
d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency ....
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derogation provisions-is the bedrock of its legitimacy, earned
through embedded liberalism. The WTO's use of harmonization
agreements threatens to undermine this bargain.
Aside from a standstill, this Article proposes two solutions
for retaining the WTO bargain: updating the derogation provisions to modern conditions with greater carve-outs, some focused on specific international agreements; and tying existing
defensive harmonization measures explicitly to the derogation
provisions.
The immediate future for the WTO is not as a world government, but as a trade institution aware of its powerful effect
on the promotion and attainment of non-trade values. To this
end, non-trade values in the WTO should be wielded as a shield,
not sharpened as a sword.
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